Food Security in Pakistan: From Policy to Delivery

Explore how Pakistan can strengthen food security by turning its 2018 policy vision into accountable action. Learn why measurable targets, reliable financing, federal-provincial coordination and investment in storage, infrastructure and value chains are essential to ensure food security in Pakistan.

POLICY BRIEFS

Muhammad Mohib Ladin, Saba Javed & Rameesha Amjad Ali

11/16/2026

a woman standing in a field holding a bowl of food
a woman standing in a field holding a bowl of food

Pakistan presents a striking paradox. It is an agricultural country with fertile plains, diverse farming systems and millions of hardworking farmers, yet millions of its citizens struggle to secure adequate food. In the 2025 Global Hunger Index, Pakistan ranked 106th out of 123 countries, with hunger classified as “serious.” Nearly 59 million Pakistanis are estimated to lack sufficient food. The question is therefore not simply whether Pakistan produces enough food, but why food production has failed to translate into food security.

The answer lies partly in the gap between policy ambition and implementation. The National Food Security Policy 2018 provides a compelling case. Introduced as a comprehensive framework for a “Food Secure Pakistan,” it moved beyond the traditional emphasis on increasing crop production. It recognised the four dimensions of food security i.e. availability, access, utilization and stability and sought to address nutrition, climate change, agricultural productivity and the food value chain from farm to consumer.

Its objectives were ambitious and broadly aligned with Pakistan’s needs. The policy aimed to reduce child stunting and malnutrition, raise agricultural growth to 4% annually, reduce post-harvest losses and increase institutional agricultural credit from Rs 700 billion to more than Rs 1 trillion. It also called for diversified and nutritious diets, improved storage and cold-chain infrastructure, protection of vulnerable populations and stronger agricultural research and extension systems.

Yet the distance between these objectives and outcomes remains substantial. Agricultural growth has remained around 2.89%, well below the policy’s 4% target. Food insecurity has also worsened rather than declined, reportedly increasing by 56% between 2019 and 2025. These outcomes suggest that the central weakness was not necessarily the policy’s vision, but the institutional architecture available to implement it.

The 2018 policy was, in many respects, a blueprint without an adequate delivery mechanism. Its broad objectives were not consistently translated into measurable, time-bound implementation targets at provincial and district levels. Responsibilities across federal and provincial institutions remained insufficiently coordinated, while implementation lacked strong accountability mechanisms. Most importantly, ambitious policy commitments were not matched by predictable and dedicated financial resources.

This experience offers a broader lesson for Pakistan’s food-security governance: a sound policy document is only the starting point. Without legally supported responsibilities, measurable targets, institutional coordination, monitoring mechanisms and sustained financing, even a comprehensive food-security strategy can remain largely aspirational. The challenge now is to convert the vision of the 2018 policy into an accountable implementation framework capable of delivering measurable improvements in food access, nutrition and resilience.

Three Structural Cracks: Why the Policy Failed to Deliver

The National Food Security Policy 2018 contained an ambitious vision, but its implementation framework had three fundamental weaknesses: unclear targets, fragmented institutional coordination, and the absence of legal and financial backing. Together, these weaknesses transformed an otherwise comprehensive strategy into a largely aspirational document.

The first crack was the absence of measurable targets. The policy frequently used broad commitments such as reducing malnutrition, improving food security and increasing agricultural growth, but did not consistently specify how much improvement should be achieved or by when. For example, while the policy identified undernourishment and child stunting as major concerns, it did not establish sufficiently precise, time-bound targets against which progress could be systematically assessed. Without a baseline, target, timeline and responsible institution, monitoring becomes difficult and accountability weak. A national policy cannot simply state that the country will move toward food security; it must define where it is going, how quickly it intends to get there and how progress will be measured.

The same weakness was evident in financing. The policy outlined ambitious interventions but did not provide a comprehensive costing framework or identify a dedicated financing mechanism for implementation. As a strategic framework, it depended largely on subsequent federal and provincial budgetary processes. This created a structural disconnect between policy commitments and available resources. Budget allocations can be delayed, reduced or redirected in response to fiscal pressures and changing political priorities. The livestock sector illustrates the problem. During 2023–24, Rs 2.5 billion was allocated for development, but only 44%, or approximately Rs 1.1 billion, was reportedly disbursed. Such gaps between approved and actual expenditure make sustained implementation difficult.

The second crack was institutional fragmentation. The 18th Constitutional Amendment devolved agriculture to the provinces, fundamentally changing the governance landscape. While the federal government, particularly through the Ministry of National Food Security and Research, retained an important national coordination role, implementation increasingly rested with provincial governments. This division created opportunities for locally tailored policies, but it also increased the need for effective mechanisms to coordinate national priorities.

Food security, however, does not respect provincial boundaries. Seed quality, pest surveillance, climate risks, agricultural markets, nutrition and food supply chains often require coordinated action across provinces. In practice, differences in provincial priorities and institutional capacity can produce fragmented responses. The policy recognised the importance of federal-provincial coordination, but did not establish sufficiently strong mechanisms, responsibilities or accountability arrangements to make that coordination operational.

The final crack was the policy’s limited legal authority. The National Food Security Policy 2018 was approved by the federal cabinet but was not enacted as a dedicated law by Parliament. Consequently, its provisions did not carry the same legal force as statutory obligations. Without clear legislative mandates, institutions have limited incentives to maintain policy commitments when fiscal pressures or political priorities change. The absence of a legally anchored implementation framework also weakened accountability for missed targets and inadequate coordination.

These three weaknesses reinforced one another. Unclear targets made performance difficult to assess; fragmented governance complicated implementation; and the absence of dedicated financing and legal authority weakened institutional commitment. The result was a policy with a strong vision but an inadequate delivery architecture. Pakistan’s experience demonstrates that food-security policies must be designed not only around what should be achieved, but also around who will deliver it, with what resources, under what legal authority and against which measurable indicators.

The Consequence: When Policy Failure Becomes Market Failure

The institutional weaknesses of the National Food Security Policy 2018 did not remain confined to government offices. They translated into real market failures that continue to undermine Pakistan’s food security. Post-harvest losses provide a clear example. Pakistan reportedly loses around 10–22% of its agricultural produce after harvest, depending on the crop and stage of the value chain. These losses represent far more than wasted food; they also mean wasted land, irrigation water, energy, labour, inputs and farmers’ capital.

The underlying problem is systemic. Farmers often lack access to information and extension services on improved harvesting, handling, drying, packaging and storage practices. Smallholders, in particular, may have little capacity to adopt improved technologies without affordable finance and technical support. At the same time, modern warehouses, cold-storage facilities, refrigerated transport and other elements of the cold chain require substantial investment. Their benefits extend beyond individual businesses to farmers, consumers and the wider economy, creating a classic public-good and coordination problem. Private investors may therefore underinvest where returns are uncertain, infrastructure costs are high or supply is fragmented.

Credit constraints further deepen the problem. A small farmer facing high production costs and uncertain market prices may prioritise immediate household and production expenses rather than investing in storage infrastructure that generates returns over a longer period. Consequently, produce is often sold immediately after harvest, when market supplies are highest and prices may be relatively low. Weak coordination among farmers, traders, processors, transporters and wholesalers can further increase handling losses and reduce the value captured by producers.

The National Food Security Policy 2018 identified post-harvest losses as an important challenge, but recognition alone could not correct these market failures. Effective intervention requires investment, institutional coordination, technical support and appropriate incentives. Government has a critical role in creating the enabling environment through rural infrastructure, targeted credit, extension, quality standards, market information and public-private partnerships.

The broader lesson is important: food security cannot be achieved simply by increasing production. If a significant share of what farmers produce is lost before reaching consumers, additional production may only mask underlying inefficiencies. Pakistan therefore needs to shift from a production-centred approach toward a food-system approach that protects value from farm to market and ensures that increased agricultural output actually becomes accessible, nutritious food.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s experience with the National Food Security Policy 2018 demonstrates that a comprehensive policy vision is not enough to achieve food security. The policy correctly recognised the need to address availability, access, utilization and stability, but weak implementation mechanisms limited its impact. Unclear and non-time-bound targets, fragmented federal-provincial coordination, inadequate financing and limited legal authority created an institutional gap between policy commitments and outcomes. These weaknesses have also contributed to market failures, including persistent post-harvest losses, inadequate storage and cold-chain infrastructure, limited access to finance and weak coordination across food value chains.

Pakistan now needs to move from policy formulation to accountable policy delivery. Future food-security strategies should establish measurable targets, clearly assign institutional responsibilities, secure predictable financing and strengthen federal-provincial coordination. Investment should also prioritise storage, rural infrastructure, extension, market information and affordable credit. Most importantly, food security must be approached as a complete food-system challenge rather than a production target alone. Reducing losses and improving the efficiency of the value chain can help ensure that more of what Pakistan produces becomes affordable, accessible and nutritious food for its people.

Please note that the views expressed in this article are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of any organization.

The writers are affiliated with The Institute of Agricultural and Resource Economics, and Department of Entomology, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan, respectively and can be reached at saba.javed@uaf.edu.pk

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